Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics

When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm‐specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high‐productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump‐sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low‐wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location.     

Some Effects of EU Sugar Reforms on Development in Africa

Intereconomics - The sugar industry is a major provider of jobs and income for sugar-exporting countries in Africa. The lower sugar prices that were caused by the recent liberalisation of the EU...     

Interaction effects between dynamic hybrid products and traditional deferred annuities in the German life insurance market

Financial Markets and Portfolio Management - Dynamic hybrid products emerged in 2007 and are now well established in the German life insurance market. In this article, we study interaction effects...     

The role of leadership in salespeople’s price negotiation behavior

Salespeople assume a key role in defending firms’ price levels in price negotiations with customers. The degree to which salespeople defend prices should critically depend upon their leaders’ influence. However, the influence of leadership on salespeople’s price defense behavior is barely understood, conceptually or empirically. Therefore, building on social learning theory, the authors propose that salespeople might adopt their leaders’ price defense behavior given a transformational leadership style. Furthermore, drawing on the contingency leadership perspective, the authors argue that this adoption fundamentally depends on three variables deduced from the motivation–ability–opportunity (MAO) framework, that is, salespeople’s learning motivation, negotiation efficacy, and perceived customer lenience. Results of a multi-level model using data from 92 salespeople and 264 salesperson–customer interactions confirm these predictions. The first to explore contingencies of salespeople’s adoption of their transformational leaders’ price negotiation behaviors, this study extends marketing theory and provides actionable guidance to practitioners.     

Hedging with small uncertainty aversion

We study the pricing and hedging of derivative securities with uncertainty about the volatility of the underlying asset. Rather than taking all models from a prespecified class equally seriously, we penalise less plausible ones based on their “distance” to a reference local volatility model. In the limit for small uncertainty aversion, this leads to explicit formulas for prices and hedging strategies in terms of the security’s cash gamma.     

Model uncertainty,recalibration, and the emergence of delta–vega hedging

We study option pricing and hedging with uncertainty about a Black–Scholes reference model which is dynamically recalibrated to the market price of a liquidly traded vanilla option. For dynamic trading in the underlying asset and this vanilla option, delta–vega hedging is asymptotically optimal in the limit for small uncertainty aversion. The corresponding indifference price corrections are determined by the disparity between the vegas, gammas, vannas and volgas of the non-traded and the liquidly traded options.     

Fiscal equalisation schemes under competition

This paper considers optimal fiscal equalisation in a federation that competes with other federations for business tax base. It formalises the argument that, under certain circumstances, federations have an incentive to foster tax competition among their subunits in order to attract tax base from other federations. We show that optimal fiscal equalisation serves the purpose of redistributing income from rich to poor subunits and of choosing an optimal level of tax competition. The latter is chosen as a trade-off between three goals. First, decentralised tax rate setting has positive fiscal externalities within the federation and, thus, tax rates are inefficiently low. Second, in the presence of hold-up problems in investment, tax rates may be inefficiently high. Then, tax competition serves as a commitment device for low future tax rates and is, thus, welfare enhancing. Third, generous fiscal equalisation within the federation is a commitment to not aggressively compete with subunits outside the federation for tax base; as a consequence, with optimal equalisation, equilibrium tax rates are higher within and outside the federation—and even higher than in the case of centralised (i.e. federal level) tax rate setting.     

Correcting for the Missing Rich: An Application to Wealth Survey Data

It is a well‐known criticism that if the distribution of wealth is highly concentrated, survey data are hardly reliable when it comes to analyzing the richest parts of society. This paper addresses this criticism by providing a general rationale of the underlying methodological problem as well as by proposing a specific methodological approach tailored to correcting the arising bias. We illustrate the latter approach by using Austrian data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. Specifically, we identify suitable parameter combinations by using a series of maximum‐likelihood estimates and appropriate goodness‐of‐fit tests to avoid arbitrariness with respect to the fitting of the Pareto distribution. Our results suggest that the alleged non‐observation bias is considerable, accounting for about one quarter of total net wealth in the case of Austria. The method developed in this paper can easily be applied to other countries where survey data on wealth are available.